

THE FUTURE OF AIR NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY (ANGLICO)

BY

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THE FUTURE OF AIR NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY (ANGLICO)

by

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ABSTRACT

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In an attempt to provide some clarity on the unique role ANGLICO plays as part of the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), and to shed some light on several key issues/concerns, the intent of this paper is twofold. First, provide a review of the mission, organization and concept of employment for ANGLICO, and second, to illustrate a number of the institutional challenges facing the organization.

THE FUTURE OF AIR NAVAL GUNFIRE LIAISON COMPANY (ANGLICO)

ANGLICO...We could not have operated without the critical and most professional additions to our task organization.¹

—Brigadier General Andrew Gregory
Chief, Royal Artillery, 1 UK Armoured Division

The role of the Air Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)² is to coordinate, synchronize and deconflict the use of naval surface fire support (NSFS), close air support (CAS), and artillery and rocket fires for any Joint, Allied or Coalition force operating in or adjacent to Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) battlespace. Acting as the liaison between the MAGTF and supported unit commander, ANGLICO plays a key role in ensuring seamless interoperability as it relates to fire support coordination. As the United States continues to deploy forces in support of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO),³ the importance of developing and maintaining relationships amongst coalition partners cannot be overemphasized.

The use of ANGLICO by the MAGTF commander significantly enhances his ability to develop and foster these types of relationships throughout his Area of Operation (AO). Nevertheless, despite the strategic importance of its mission (as it relates to coalition building and interoperability among Joint, Allied and Coalition partners), the capabilities and proper employment of ANGLICO remain an enigma to many within the Marine Corps. A number of factors contribute to this lack of knowledge, especially when taking into consideration the relatively small size of the unit, the unique mission, and the fact that both the active duty (AD) ANGLICOs deactivated from 1999 to 2003 as the result of a force restructuring initiative.⁴ This lack of knowledge and

understanding reverberates across the entirety of the Marine Corps, and with it, the potential to affect the future of ANGLICO as an organization.

If ANGLICO is to remain a relevant and viable force, operational-level commanders, planners, and policy makers within the higher echelons of the Marine Corps need a more robust understanding of its capabilities, concepts of employment, and institutional challenges. In light of these, the overall intent of this paper is threefold—first, to provide a brief history of ANGLICO and an overview of its organization and concept for employment, secondly, to identify a number of institutional challenges faced by ANGLICO, and finally, to provide recommendations to mitigate those institutional challenges and enhance ANGLICO's applicability as a warfighting organization.

Brief History

ANGLICO evolved from the Joint Allied Signal Companies (JASCO)⁵ used in World War II to provide coordination and control of naval gunfire and close air support (CAS) throughout the island hopping campaign in the Pacific Theater. Officially designated as ANGLICO in 1949, these units quickly found themselves deployed to Korea in 1950, participating in numerous combat operations across the peninsula.⁶ In the years leading up to US involvement in the Vietnam War, ANGLICO participated in additional actions in Lebanon and the Dominican Republic. In May of 1965, ANGLICO deployed to Vietnam and became part of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). For the next 8 years, ANGLICO would coordinate and synchronize naval gunfire, artillery and close air support across the entire country of Vietnam.⁷ Throughout the remainder of the 1970s and into the next decade, ANGLICO detachments deployed regularly with Marine Amphibious Units (MAUs) into the western Pacific and Mediterranean (MAUs converted to Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) in February of

1988). Highlights during those years were operations as part of the Multinational Peacekeeping Operations in Lebanon and the invasion of Grenada in October of 1983.

When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, ANGLICO deployed in support of Operation Desert Shield. ANGLICO as a concept came of age during Operation Desert Storm due largely to the support provided to a wide array of coalition forces operating in or adjacent to the MAGTF battlespace. Although ANGLICO participated in numerous operations throughout the campaign, most notable were the actions at the Battle of Khafji⁸ which was the first major ground combat operation of the war. After the cessation of hostilities in Southwest Asia, ANGLICO returned to the Continental United States (CONUS) and settled back down into the MEU deployment cycle.

In May of 1999, the two active duty ANGLICOs were deactivated as the result of a force restructuring initiative,⁹ and replaced with the substantially smaller and subsequently less capable Marine Liaison Element (MLE).¹⁰ After initial combat operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the reduced sized of the MLEs proved inadequate in light of the numerous requirements for fire support coordination as part of coalition operations. In September 2003, ANGLICO reactivated and immediately commenced support of combat operations in Iraq, maintaining a continual presence until 2008.¹¹ By the spring of 2009, ANGLICO transitioned from the dwindling fight in Iraq in order to support renewed ground combat operations in southern Afghanistan, providing an array of fire support coordination and liaison for numerous Joint, Allied, and Coalition force units operating with the United States Marine Corps.

Organization and Concept for Employment

Today there are three active duty component ANGLICOs, each associated with a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), and two reserve component ANGLICOs¹² attached to Marine Forces Reserve (MARFORRES). ANGLICO is one of the five separate battalion-level organizations that fall under the administrative control (ADCON) of the MEF Headquarters Group (MHG). ANGLICO is normally under the operational control (OPCON) of the MAGTF commander, with its task organized teams in direct support (DS) of the Joint, Allied or Coalition forces operating within or adjacent to MAGTF battlespace.¹³





Figure 1:

With an authorized Table of Organization (T/O)¹⁴ strength of 201 personnel, each ANGLICO consists of 42 Marine officers, 150 Marine enlisted, 3 Navy officers and 6 Navy enlisted, and possesses the ability to provide liaison and fire support coordination expertise to an entire Joint, Allied, or Coalition division. An ANGLICO consists of three brigade (BDE) platoons under a company headquarters. Each BDE platoon consists of

two Supporting Arms Liaison Teams (SALTs) comprised of a headquarters and two Firepower Control Teams (FCTs).



SALT=Supporting Arms Liaison Team x 6

()=Number of personnel per element

FCT=Firepower Control Team x 12

	MO	ME	NO	NE	Total
T/O	42	150	3	6	201

Figure 2:

At the company level, ANGLICO Firepower Control Teams (FCTs) arrive manned and equipped to provide the combined elements of a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) and a Fire Support Team (FiST). These 4-man FCTs are capable of planning, coordinating, and deconflicting mortar, artillery, rocket and naval gunfire, as well as requesting aviation / ISR assets, and providing terminal control for close air support.

At the maneuver battalion, Supporting Arms Liaison Team (SALT) headquarters arrive manned and equipped to conduct operations as a battalion-level Fire Support Coordination Center (FSCC) capable of planning, coordinating and deconflicting all types of lethal fires. Additionally, each SALT headquarters possesses the ability to plan

for aviation assault support, and perform many of the functions associated with a Direct Air Support Center (DASC) or Air Support Element (ASE), such as processing immediate direct air support requests and providing procedural control for aircraft prior to handing them off to the terminal attack controller.

The BDE platoon headquarters and the company headquarters operate at the maneuver brigade and division headquarters respectively. In both cases, each come manned and equipped to perform the duties of a brigade/division-level FSCC with the appropriate planning and liaison capabilities. Despite its small size, ANGLICO possesses an extremely robust fire support coordination capability.

Institutional Challenges

When reactivated in 2003, the ANGLICOs faced a different world. Gone were the MEU deployments, airborne operations, participation in training exercises with the Joint, Allied, and Coalition partners, and the basic stability that comes with having an established and accepted *modus operandi*. It was a time of war and ANGLICO immediately fell into a brutal deployment cycle that often provided only five months at home between the standard seven-month rotations. This compressed deployment schedule left little time to worry about issues not directly associated with preparing Marines and Sailors for combat. Although the addition of a third active duty ANGLICO (5th ANGLICO) slowed the pace of the deployments, almost seven years after being reactivated, ANGLICO continues searching for its niche in the Marine Corps. The following discussion presents several of the institutional challenges faced by ANGLICO as it continues to chart its future within the Marine Corps.

Shaping ANGLICO for Non-Doctrinal Employment. Operation Iraqi Freedom was a tale of two wars for ANGLICO. Initially, ANGLICO performed their traditional role of

providing liaison and fire support coordination to Joint and Allied forces during the conventional fighting of OIF I, as well as the counterinsurgency operations that followed. As the insurgency in the Al Anbar province eventually cooled, ANGLICO's focus shifted to providing liaison and force protection to the nascent Iraqi Army operating within the MAGTF battlespace.

When the Iraqi Army moved south to fight the Shiia militias in Basra in 2008, they successfully lobbied Multinational Corps Iraq (MNC-I) to maintain possession of their associated US Military Transition Teams (MTTs). In turn, the MTTs successfully lobbied to maintain possession of the SALTs and associated FCTs that had been providing mutual security for them, and access to Coalition fire support / ISR assets for the Iraqis. For the first time since the Vietnam War, ANGLICO teams found themselves far from MAGTF battlespace and operating exclusively with indigenous forces engaged in bitter sectarian fighting.

Doctrinally, the MAGTF commander exercises command and control over the forces supported by ANGLICO.¹⁵ In this case, ANGLICO teams were now in Direct Support (DS) of indigenous forces operating independently from the MAGTF and the ANGLICO headquarters. The 450-mile separation from the MAGTF created a number of challenges not only with command and control, but also with getting wounded Marines and Sailors to a US Combat Surgical Hospital (CSH) within the golden hour (the hour immediately following traumatic injury in which medical treatment to prevent irreversible internal damage and optimize the chance of survival is most effective).¹⁶ Additionally, there were the problems of fuel and ammunition resupply, update of communications security (COMSEC) material, and the repair / replacement of damaged or inoperable

gear and equipment. Solving or mitigating these issues required extensive cross boundary coordination between the MAGTF, MNC-I, and the British forces operating in Basra as part of Multinational Division Southeast (MND-SE). This coordination led to the development and implementation of numerous tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) that became Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) for the remainder of the deployment.

As the US develops a strategy to address the persistent conflict anticipated in the foreseeable future, the likelihood of major combat operations against a peer/near-peer competitor is highly unlikely. With the focus of effort shifting to counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, and support and stability operations, the challenge for the Marine Corps becomes taking a hard look at the doctrinal way ANGLICO is organized and equipped in order to ensure it possesses the right mix of training and personnel required to operate in a non-traditional/non-linear environment. Recommendations include Survival, Evasion, Resistance and Escape (SERE) and advance combat trauma/live tissue training,¹⁷ additional instruction focused on operating independently amongst indigenous populations, and the addition of dedicated communications technicians and mechanics at the SALT HQ. The bottom line is that ANGLICO must be prepared to operate in an austere environment, without immediate access to US/MAGTF logistical and life support.

The Airborne Mission. Following the theme of the previous paragraph, the longstanding issue of reinstating the airborne mission for the active component (AC) is crucial in the determination of how ANGLICO is going to train and fight in the future.¹⁸ Prior to its deactivation in 1999, ANGLICO's mission statement directed that the

company maintain an airdrop capability in order to support airborne and special operations forces. When reactivated in 2003, the airdrop reference did not exist in the unit's concept of employment. As with several of the institutional challenges faced by ANGLICO, the airborne mission continues to languish in the shadows of more pressing issues such as the current deployment cycle and Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC) certification shortfalls.

Why does the ANGLICO need the airborne mission? The answer in simple terms is ANGLICO's primary mission is to work directly with Joint, Allied, and Coalition forces, many of whom have, and desire to use, an airborne insertion capability. On numerous occasions, British Commandos and Royal Marines, Republic of Korea (ROK) Army, 82d Airborne Division, 75th Ranger Regiment, and Special Forces units have approached ANGLICO, asking them to participate in airborne operations in both real world contingencies and joint training exercises. These Joint and Allied forces understand ANGLICO's capabilities and concepts of employment, and consistently seek training opportunities that provide for the exchange of techniques, tactics and procedures, improved interoperability, and strengthened relationships.

Once agreement on the need for an airborne capability is established, then the next question is how much. Based on the input of former and current ANGLICO commanders,¹⁹ the recommendation is to build an initial airborne capability based around one BDE platoon for each of the active component ANGLICOs. This capability would provide ANGLICO additional flexibility, enabling them to participate in a wider variety of missions in support of their Joint, Allied and Coalition counterparts.

Fixing ANGLICO's Identity Crisis. Due to its small size and unique mission, many throughout the Marine Corps have little to no idea as to the organization and capabilities of ANGLICO. Compounding the problem is the fact that the active duty ANGLICOs were deactivated for a five-year period starting in 1999. Out of sight and out of mind, ANGLICO flies below the radar of many within its own service. The following four anecdotes highlight the lack of knowledge and understanding of ANGLICO as an organization. When examined separately, each instance may seem banal or inconsequential, however, when examined as a whole they indicate a potentially systemic problem starting at Headquarters Marine Corps and filtering down to the operating force level.

(1) Each year, Headquarters Marine Corps publishes and distributes "Concepts and Programs" which is an approximately 300-page document describing in detail the operating concepts and organization of Marine forces. Chapter 2 lists all the forces associated with each of the MEFs. Each MEF HQ lists all the separate battalions belonging to the MEF with one exception: ANGLICO.

(2) An ANGLICO preparing for a deployment requests permission to conduct an alternate Mission Rehearsal Exercise (MRX) as part of the Predeployment Training Program (PTP). The approval authority is Marine Corps Training and Education Command (TECOM). The request comes back approved with guidance directing that upon completion of training, the Commanding General (CG), 1st Marine Division reports ANGLICO PTP certified. (ANGLICO as a MEF asset should not be certified by a division).

(3) An ANGLICO conducting planning for a training exercise with a coalition partner overseas is required to release a message to Marine Forces Europe (MARFOREUR) requesting approval to participate. The communications officer routes the message through the MEF to ensure higher headquarters has visibility. The message returns with a note stating that the request requires routing through the division. (Even within the MEF, a staff officer believes ANGLICO is part of the division).

(4) A MEF G-3 planner inquires as to the number of ANGLICO teams available to support a Regimental Combat Team (RCT). The response provided identifies a BDE platoon headquarters and two SALTs with their organic FCTs. Puzzled, the G-3 planner inquires about the makeup of the organization on the response. After hearing the explanation, the G-3 planner comments that he is not interested in all “that other stuff,” he only wants the JTACs. This mindset demonstrates the lack of understanding that the strength of ANGLICO comes from the synergy created by the teams working in conjunction with one another. The misnomer that ANGLICO is a readymade pool of JTACs available to support Marine Corps units is common. Although support to a Marine unit is entirely possible, ANGLICO is as a MAGTF commander asset optimally used to support Joint, Allied and Coalition forces operating in or adjacent to his battlespace.

Based on these four short real-world scenarios, it is clear that ANGLICO has an identity crisis due largely to the lack of visibility or understanding as to its mission and organization by most people outside of ANGLICO. The challenge becomes finding the best method of educating the force as to the capabilities and employment concepts of ANGLICO in order to insure efficient and effective use of this dynamic asset.

School Seats for Joint Terminal Attack Controllers (JTACs). US involvement in Overseas Contingency Operations continues to fuel the high demand for current and qualified JTACs by all branches of the armed forces. As units prepare to deploy to Afghanistan, the Tactical Air Control Party schools at both the Atlantic and Pacific Expeditionary Warfare Training Groups (EWTGs) are running at maximum capacity. The desire to have JTACs down at the lowest tactical level (platoon) is putting an enormous strain on the training system and creating a situation that forces units who require JTACs by T/O to give up school seats to deploying units.

While a cadre of entry-level trained JTACs floods the market, organizations like ANGLICO face the prospect of having to operate without their required allotment of terminal attack controllers. Although efforts continue to secure additional seats, ANGLICO still runs the risk of dropping below their authorized strength of 29 Forward Air Controllers (FACs) and JTACs.

Accepting this risk increases the potential for a reduced capability of support, and exponentially increases the number of new FACs/JTACs within the unit still requiring advanced training. Solving the issues of throughput at the schoolhouse and lack of resources for training²⁰ is not going to be easy. The challenge now becomes finding a way to insure ANGLICO maintains a cadre of current and qualified FACs/JTACs so they can continue to meet their operational requirements in support of Joint, Allied and Coalition forces.

Maintaining Unit Integrity. The lack of knowledge and understanding about ANGLICO makes it difficult for planners and decision makers to comprehend fully the second and third order effects associated with a decision to task personnel from the

company to fill extraneous billets. By the same token, failure to understand the flexible and dynamic nature of ANGLICO prevents those same planners and decision makers from effectively employing the unit and maximizing the full extent of their capabilities. Unused ANGLICO forces become non-deployers, and non-deployers always become fair game for extraneous personnel tasking. The following examples illustrate the detrimental effects experienced by ANGLICO as the result of improper personnel management and planning.

In 2007, as I MEF prepared for its assumption of duties as Multinational Forces-West (MNF-W), it tasked ANGLICO (also in the process of preparing to deploy) to provide 14 personnel to fill two Port of Entry Transition Teams (POETTs) positioned on the western border of Iraq. Because of specific rank and Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) requirements, 9 of the 14 personnel provided were current and qualified JTACs. The impact caused by this decision surfaced several months into the deployment when the MEF identified a requirement for ANGLICO to provide additional FCTs. With support to the Iraqi Army already stretching ANGLICOs reduced capacity, MEF approved an ANGLICO recommendation to recall team members serving on the POETTs in order to reconstitute two FCTs. Although the situation worked out in the end, there were several challenges associated with reconstituting the teams ranging from acquiring the needed equipment and vehicles from the BDE platoons to coordinating for aircraft in order to conduct refresher training for JTACs unable to control any type of air during the five months spent with the POETTs.

As II MEF began to ramp up for their deployment to Afghanistan in 2009, it was decided that the requirement for ANGLICO would be limited to a BDE platoon. With no

mission for the company headquarters or remaining BDE platoon, ANGLICO found itself as a force provider, filling numerous augmentee billets and assuming responsibility for the MHG Remain Behind Element (RBE). The nature of the operational environment in Afghanistan, especially as it relates to working with other Joint and Allied forces, is tailor made for ANGLICO. Nevertheless, instead of leveraging its capabilities, the company was picked apart and rendered essentially combat ineffective. Granted there are force caps to consider, but if the planners truly understood the dynamic nature of ANGLICO, perhaps a greater effort to get the entire organization included on the force list would occur.

ANGLICO provides a unique capability. If the planners and decision makers do not understand the dynamic and flexible nature of this unit, they cannot utilize them fully. The “improper use of” or “failure to use” has the same detrimental impact on a unique unit like ANGLICO. In order to prevent similar occurrences in the future, the challenge becomes convincing the Marines Corps that although it is not a “special” unit, the unique skill set and mission profile merits ANGLICO the same protection from external taskings as currently enjoyed by Marine reconnaissance units.

The Way Ahead

If ANGLICO is to remain a relevant and viable force, operational-level commanders, planners, and policy makers within the higher echelons of the Marine Corps need a better understanding of its capabilities, concepts of employment, and visibility on the institutional challenges associated with a small and often enigmatic organization. Associated with increased education is the need for ANGLICO to have a strong voice at the higher echelons of the Marines Corps. Because ANGLICO does not have a dedicated occupational field sponsor, it is essential to ensure the advocacy

process accurately and thoroughly represents the organizations interests. Making sure the right people are in key positions is critical to ensuring the future success of the organization. In order to remain viable, organizations cannot be satisfied with the status quo. Exploration and experimentation with new concepts and methods of employment prevent the stagnation that eventually leads to a loss of relevancy. Organizations that cannot grow or change face extinction. The following discussion highlights several recommended changes or improvements to the status quo in order to better solidify ANGLICO's relevancy and future viability as an organization.

Education. The first step in better educating the Marine Corps on the capabilities and employment concepts of ANGLICO is through the development and widespread promulgation of a doctrinal publication dedicated exclusively to the organization. In theory, this document would consist of roughly five or six chapters focused on an overview of the organization, the equipment used in the execution of its mission, planning considerations and operational employment, and a breakout of the individual, section, and company training requirements.

The focus of the first chapter would center on a detailed explanation of ANGLICO's overall mission, defining its specific role in MAGTF operations, providing a concise written and graphic explanation of the how ANGLICO is organized, and a listing of the required tasks associated with conducting combat operations. A second chapter would be dedicated to describing the wide array of equipment associated with ANGLICO and its employment by the FCTs, SALTs and BDE platoons. This chapter is important because it provides the reader a clear understanding of the enormous technical capabilities ANGLICO brings to the fight.

Because of its diverse capabilities, and in consideration of the multitude of assets ANGLICO can bring to bear on the battlefield, a third chapter would focus solely on ANGLICO's role in the planning cycle, specifically how it interjects itself into the process from the supported company level up to the division headquarters. A fourth, and probably the largest chapter, would be dedicated to a detailed discussion of the operational employment of ANGLICO. This chapter would cover scenarios ranging from the doctrinal employment of ANGLICO at the division level in Major Combat Operations (MCOs), down to the smaller non-standard operations associated with counterinsurgency or counterterrorism. Use of the scenarios is intended to help the commander or planners better frame ANGLICO's capabilities and how best to employ them in the fight.

A final chapter would provide an overview of the extensive training done by ANGLICO at all levels, from individual combat skills, through the work done by the teams, the BDE platoons and the company as a whole. Similar to chapters on equipment and concepts of employment, the intent for this section is to provide commanders and planners a better understanding of the enormous amount of training and preparation required for ANGLICO to accomplish its assigned mission successfully.

The second step in the education process involves doing a detailed analysis of the Programs of Instruction (POI) at the ground combat MOS producing schools, the Captain's Career Courses (CCCs), Intermediate and Top Level Schools, as well as the Staff NCO Academies and Advanced Courses. The purpose of this analysis is to assess the amount of exposure to ANGLICO the students receive as well as validate the accuracy of the content in the POI. The take away here is that since it has only been six

years since the reactivation of ANGLICO, it is possible that references to ANGLICO have not been fully incorporated into the Professional Military Education (PME) system or that the information being taught is dated or no longer valid. In addition to validating and improving the information included in the various curriculums, the Marine Corps must take a hard look at revamping wargames, simulations, and classroom exercises in order to include the use of ANGLICO.

Advocacy. Because ANGLICO is considered a separate battalion within the MEF, there is a direct line in the command relationship between the ANGLICO commander and the commanding general. The plus side of this relationship is that the ANGLICO commander enjoys great autonomy and freedom of action. The downside is that there are often "commander to commander" issues dealing with unit employment and personnel that require adjudication below the Commanding General (CG) level. Often physically separated from the MEF, the ANGLICO commander requires an advocate on the staff who understands and can verbalize the unit's unique capabilities, concepts of employment and personnel requirements. As the operations officer for the MEF, the G-3 is the logical choice to be this advocate. The challenge for all ANGLICO commanders is developing and maintaining a good working relationship with the MEF G-3 throughout all phases of the deployment cycle. Combined with an in-depth discussion on ANGLICO's capabilities and limitations, this partnership creates a number of second and third order effects that cascade down through the MEF staff, enabling them to make better decisions concerning the proper employment of ANGLICO and its personnel.

Outside of the tactical arena, having the right personnel in key places at Headquarters Marine Corps is also essential to ensuring issues involving ANGLICO

have an advocate at the service level. Although there is no occupational field sponsor for ANGLICO, proponency for the organization falls under the Ground Combat Element (GCE) Branch that is part of the Operations Division of Plans, Policies and Operations (PP&O) at HQMC. The GCE Branch consists of a number of individual sections, which include the occupational field sponsors for infantry, artillery and armor, as well as reconnaissance and amphibian assault vehicles. The Section Head of GCE Command and Control²¹ is the individual responsible for issues dealing with Command and Control within the GCE, but by default, he is also the advocate for all things ANGLICO.

In order to ensure the best interests of ANGLICO, it is imperative that the Ground Combat Arms Monitor staffs the POG-28 (Policies and Operations, Ground Combat Element) position with an officer who has recent ANGLICO experience. Having an officer who understands ANGLICO as the advocate at higher headquarters translates to future success for the organization. Working in close conjunction with ANGLICO commanders will ensure the most recent issues from the field receive appropriate action. This should not be a difficult task for the Manpower Assignments Manager. Between the three active component ANGLICOs, there should always be a ground combat field grade officer ready to execute PCS orders. The bottom line is that keeping this billet filled by an ANGLICO alumnus will pay huge dividends for the ANGLICO community for years to come.

A Radical Thought. In order to remain viable, organizations cannot be satisfied with the status quo. The exploration of new ideas and experimentation with new concepts and methods of employment will prevent stagnation that eventually leads to a loss of relevancy. As the Marine Corps looks towards the future, it must consider an

expanded role for ANGLICO. The concept of the organization is sound, and although compact, the dynamic skills and synergy ANGLICO brings to the fight are a force multiplier for the supported commander. In the spirit of thinking “outside the box,” the expansion of the ANGLICO concept should extend down into the Marine division or (GCE). Although a radical departure from the norm, the division ANGLICO concept aligns with many of the processes currently resident within the division’s fire support realm.

In essence, the entire division’s fire support coordination capability consolidates under a battalion level organization built around the ANGLICO model and is resident within the artillery regiment. Although some rank changes for individual billets would be required, most of the structure currently exists in both the infantry and artillery regiments.²² Concepts of employment are similar to those at the MEF. The division ANGLICO is OPCON to the division commander with its teams in direct support of the infantry companies, battalions and regiments. The question then becomes, “Why change something that is already working?” Consolidating the fire support capability provides standardization of processes, quality control of training and unity of effort across the entire division. Some would argue that this already exists, but the reality is it does not. A clear-cut example is the quality control of training for the division’s FACs. The regimental Air Officers (AOs) are responsible for insuring their FACs/JTACs are being trained and operating according to the TACP Training and Readiness (T&R) manual. The result is three separate regiments have three separate interpretations of what constitutes adherence to the standard. If all FACs/JTACs consolidate under one

command, standardization of training and quality control is substantially easier to achieve.

The key takeaway in this argument is that if you understand the concept of ANGLICO, you understand the dynamic capability of the organization. ANGLICO's work ethic and professionalism are legion among the Joint, Allied, and Coalition units it supports. This recommendation has the potential to make that same capability resident within the Marine division.

Conclusion

Despite its relatively small size, ANGLICO's ability to coordinate, synchronize and deconflict naval surface fire support (NSFS), close air support (CAS), and artillery fires in support of Joint, Allied, or Coalition forces carries strategic implications. As the United States faces continued widespread conflict in an uncertain and volatile environment, political considerations and shortages of resources and manpower requires the support and cooperation of its friends and partners around the globe.

The ability to fight and win as a coalition relies heavily on the relationship and interoperability between the combined forces. Because of its technical expertise and robust liaison capability, ANGLICO will play a critical role in the establishment and maintenance of many of these partnerships. Therefore, it is essential that the Marine Corps fully comprehends the capabilities and limitations of ANGLICO, and takes the necessary steps to address and mitigate the institutional challenges threatening the relevancy and viability of the organization. In the end, having a rich history alone will not save ANGLICO; a voice, an identity, and a clear vision of the future are paramount to its survival.

Endnotes

¹ Brigadier General Andrew R. Gregory, "1st (UK) Armoured Division in Iraq: January to April 2003," *Field Artillery Journal* (Jan-Feb 2004): 15.

² There are currently three Active Duty ANGLICOs (1st, 2d and 5th). For the purpose of this paper, the general use of the term ANGLICO is inclusive of all three.

³ Formerly the Global War on Terror (GWOT).

⁴ "Structure Reviews Identify Cuts, Tail-to-Teeth Shifts," *Marine Corps Gazette* (November 1997): 4.

⁵ Robert D Heinl, "Minority Report on the (J)ASCO," *Marine Corps Gazette* (July 1947): 28-32

⁶ James L. Stokesbury, *A Short History of the Korean War* (New York, NY: Harper Perennial, 1990), 240.

⁷ Thomas Petri, *Lighting from the Sky, Thunder from the Sea* (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2009), 354.

⁸ Paul W. Westermeyer, *U.S. Marines in Battle: Al Khafji, 28 January-1 February 1991* (Washington DC: United States Marine Corps, 2008), 32.

⁹ "Structure Reviews Identify Cuts, Tail-to-Teeth Shifts," *Marine Corps Gazette* (November 1997): 4.

¹⁰ Less capable due to the large reduction of personnel. T/O change reflected a loss of 150 Marines and Sailors. (MLE T/O 4854 dated Feb 99). 247 to 97

¹¹ Peter W. Ahern; Dennis M. Cunniffe; Mitchell J. McCarthy, "Air/Naval Gunfire Liaison Company: The past, present and future," *Marine Corps Gazette* (November 2005): 72-75.

¹² Reserve component ANGLICOs were not deactivated in 1999

¹³ United States Marine Corps, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Fires*, Draft Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-43.3 (Washington DC: United States Marine Corps).

¹⁴ United States Marine Corps, *1st ANGLICO*, Unit Table of Organization and Equipment Report (Washington DC: United States Marine Corps, 15 February 2008).

¹⁵ United States Marine Corps, *Marine Air Ground Task Force Fires*, Draft Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-43.3 (Washington DC: United States Marine Corps).

¹⁶ Merriam-Webster's Medical Dictionary, <http://www2.merriam-webster.com> (accessed January 15, 2010).

¹⁷ Marine Corps Combat Development Command, "Policy Guidance for Combat Trauma Training (CTT) That Includes Live Tissue Training," memorandum for commander MARFORCOM, MARFORPAC, MARFORRES, June 26, 2007.

¹⁸ The two reserve component ANGLICOs currently retain the airborne mission.

¹⁹ Lieutenant Colonel David Stohs, USMC, e-mail message to author, March 18, 2008.

²⁰ LtCol M.J. Rodriguez, "Contract Close Air Support" briefing slides with scripted commentary, Expeditionary Warfare Training Group Pacific, 8 December 2008

²¹ The GCE C2 falls under the PP&O section POG 28. POG is a three-letter code used by PP&O to identify the Operations Division, Ground Combat Element (GCE) section.

²² United States Marine Corps, *11th Marine Regiment*, Unit Table of Organization and Equipment Report (Washington DC: United States Marine Corps, 15 March 2007).